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Variational Free Energy and
Economics Optimizing With Biases
and Bounded Rationality
Morten Henriksen1,2*
1 Ministry of Defence, Karup, Denmark, 2 AAU Business School, The Faculty of Social Sciences, Aalborg University, Aalborg,
Denmark
The purpose of this paper is to offer a new framework for understanding action,
optimization, and choice when applied to economic theory more generally. By drawing
upon the concept known as the variational free energy principle, the paper will explore
how this principle can be used to temper rational choice theory by re-formulating
how agents optimize. The approach will result in agent behavior that encompasses
a wide range of so-called cognitive biases, as seen in the scientific literature of
behavioral economics, but instead of using these biases as further indications of market
inefficiencies or market failures, the paper will likewise attempt to show the limits to
which these biases can inform or critique standard economic theory. The paper therefore
offers up a “middle of the road” approach, in which the neoclassical agent is not quite as
“rational” as rational choice theory assumes, but at the same time, not quite as irrational
as behavioral economics would often have us believe.
Keywords: optimizing behavior, behavioral economics, rational choice, variational free energy principle,
neuroeconomics
INTRODUCTION
In the theory of optimal control learning, the goal is to select an action that maximizes some value
function such that the preferred state of the world would manifest given an action. This can take
the form u∗t = arg max V (st+1|ut) = π (st), whereu is an action, s is a world state, and π is an
optimized action, an equation very much comparable to Bellman’s optimality principle believed to
be informed by Morgenstern and Neumann’s book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior from
1944 (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Friston et al., 2010).
In Bellman’s optimality principle, problems and objectives are more or less the same, meaning
that problems are framed in terms of reaching an objective or a goal. This could be how to
minimize costs or maximize profits or utility (Bellman, 1957), and from this optimality principle,
expected utility theory follows quite naturally. We cannot, however, continue in this manner
without reference to a predefined end state, in which the information contained or available at
this state is presupposed. The goal is then to formalize the exact behavior that would facilitate a
given optimal future condition. This behavior is given by the axioms of expected utility, whereby
a strict adherence to these axioms allows the economist to use positive affine transformations
on expected/subjective utility, giving utility itself an ordinal, if not cardinal value (Karni, 2014).
As such, economics provides an axiomatic explanation to human action and presumes a set of
behavioral laws on the basis of mathematical necessity/design.
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This is very important, because it allows the economist,
mathematician, or physicist to operationalize the immaterial or
intensive, such as the subjective feeling of better and worse,
into the material or extensive, such as the objective description
of utility and disutility. The reason for this is that utilities are
identical to positive affine transformations if, and only if, certain
underlying axioms are not violated. We can see this by writing
au+ b, where a > 0, u is utility, and b is any real number. If u1 >
u2, then it would also be the case that au1 + b > au2 + b as long
as a is positive. Being able to represent utility numerically then
places utility within a probability space, or σ-algebra, containing
the collection of events that can be assigned probabilities as well
as associated conditional probabilities.
The Axioms of Expected and Subjective
Utility
When utility is operationalized, then utility can be expressed in
accordance with measure-theory, given that any real number
exists within the space Rn. Concordantly, a real value function for
u must be present, depending on the outcomes {x1, x2, . . . , xn},
and their relative probabilities
(
x1, p1; x2, p2; . . . ; xn, pn
)
.
A number within Rn can then be thought of as a point within
a space defined by set theory and expressed as a particular state
or outcome belonging to a set of states or outcomes that is a
superset of various sets of acts.
In economics, the underlying axioms (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1947) are typically presented in the following way:
Completeness
A preference ordering is complete if and only if, for any two
outcomes X and Y, an individual prefers X to Y, prefers Y to X, or
is indifferent between the two. Formally this can be represented








and (x1, x2) ∼(
y1, y2
)
, with respect to a class of outcomes or a basket of goods.
Transitivity
For any three outcomes, X, Y, and Z, if X is preferred to Y, and Y is







> (z1, z2) then (x1, x2) > (z1, z2 ).
Reflexivity
(x1, x2) ≥ (x1, x2), meaning that any outcome is at least as good
as an identical outcome, or any good is at least as good itself.
Revealed Preferences
If it is revealed that outcome X is preferred to outcome Y, then
it cannot be revealed that outcome Y is preferred to outcome
X. In economics, we typically say that an individual will always
choose X over Y if both choices are present on the budget line
m so that p1x1 + p2x2 = m and p1y1 + p2y2 = m, unless relative


















Given these axioms, consumer behavior can be expressed
through indifference curves that illustrate the concept
of consumer equilibrium. But more importantly, the
axioms provide the conditions for a monotonic scale from
which utility can be measured and expressed numerically
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947).
In addition to the four axioms listed, two more must be
discussed as they, together with completeness and transitivity, are
essential for the expected utility hypothesis. These two axioms are
independence and continuity. Both completeness and transitivity
deal with preference under risk, whereas the next two axioms deal
with preferences under uncertainty (Savage, 1972).
Independence
Let p ∈ [0, 1] and X, Y, and Z be independent outcomes
or independent probability distributions over outcomes,










This means that preferences over outcomes cannot be
influenced by factors that are not relevant to the initial






















(Z). Independence says that, if the first
lottery is preferred over the second, then what determines this












(U) and Y. Embedding a direct lottery in a
compound lottery, without changing the initial conditions,
should therefore have no relevance in the valuation of the
respective lotteries.
Continuity
Using the example from the independence axiom, continuity can
be expressed as an indifference qualifier. If one prefers X to Y to
Z, then there must exist a particular p ∈ [0, 1] such that one is




Z and the certainty
of Y. Continuity thus states that a unique probability distribution
can always be found, such that one is indifferent between the
probability of receiving the most preferable outcome, plus the
probability of receiving the least preferable outcome, and the
certainty of receiving the middle outcome (Levin, 2006).
The important takeaway through all this is that most
optimization problems involving choice must implicitly accept
a set of behavioral axioms that allows for positive affine
transformations. Without the possibility for this transformation,
a real value function for utility cannot exist, and the mapping
of action between two states will consequently prove exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible. In other words, we cannot measure
utility given its non-material quality and therefore cannot in
any normative sense consider a set of choices as optimal in
comparison to any other set of choices. We can, however,
measure a number attached to utility, but only if there exists
an equivalency between optimal behavior, utility maximizing
behavior, and mathematical optimization, naturally fostering
a discussion about the degree to which optimal behavior is
representative of actual human behavior. While there have
been many attempts over the years to augment expected utility
theory by removing or altering various axioms (Rényi, 1955;
Aumann, 1962; Dubins, 1975; Giles, 1976; Giron and Rios,
1980; Fishburn, 1982; Blume et al., 1991; Galaabaatar and Karni,
2013; Zaffalon and Miranda, 2017), all of these alternative
approaches to expected/subjective utility theory rely on a general
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axiomatic foundation for utility nonetheless, either directly or by
approximation (i.e., lexicographic preferences/ordering).
This paper, far from criticizing the work of von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947), Savage (1972) and others, will, however, try
to take a different approach to the concept of optimal behavior.
By completely internalizing utility, the need to externalize utility
through positive affine transformations is bypassed, likewise
bypassing the need for an axiomatic foundation for optimal
behavior. Here information alone will provide the connection
between a partition of internal and external states though
entropy or surprise and move the objective toward optimizing
beliefs about world states, rather than the explicit utilities of
world states. As a consequence, the ordering of preferences
becomes “secondary” to the ordering of actions, by recognizing
that the imperative is to reduce expected surprisal through
adaptation. This will result in preferences that are highly context
dependent and, while it will be correct, that at any given point
in time a specific preference order exists (i.e., utility function);
this preference order must be influenced by time expressed
as surprisal/entropy in t + 1. The dynamic here presented
also extends to continuity and the concept of indifference, as
will be shown later.
Why Variational Free Energy
The variational free energy principle is herein used, in order to
provide a first principle account of how systems must behave
given a very high degree of complexity. It does this by suggesting
a variational approach to optimal behavior that absorbs both
Bayesian decision theory (Berger, 2011) and optimal Bayesian
design (Lindley, 1956). Here, the objective is to minimize
variational free energy (Parr and Friston, 2019) and by this
process provide a formal description of bounded rationality
through the use of evidence bounds. By minimizing variational
free energy, what is meant by this is simply the application
of variational mathematics to Bayesian optimality, where free
energy refers to the evidence bound between a recognition
density and a generative density, also referred to as a Kullback–
Leibler divergence. Minimizing this bound is therefore the same
as minimizing system entropy, which again can be seen as a
scheme for the maximization of model evidence. Variational
free energy therefore casts an upper bound on entropy/surprise
or a lower bound on model evidence/negative surprise, the
minimization of which results in either the update of beliefs
(change of internal states) or action (change of external states).
When Bayes optimality is subjected to a variational approach,
bounded rationality simply becomes approximate Bayesian
inference (Winn and Bishop, 2005), the foundational mechanism
by which the process of active inference is achieved. Approximate
Bayesian inference is a method that estimates the posterior
distribution/density, due to the computational complexity
associated with evaluating likelihood functions in complex
problems. This method can therefore be used to formalize
the concept of bounded rationality, as laid forth by Simon
(1957), when bounded rationality is seen as a cognitive
process limitation (Lebiere and Anderson, 2011). Given the
emphasis on optimization under constraints, it may be argued
that we are not strictly describing bounded rationality here,
but boundedly rationality (Arrow, 2004). This argument will,
however, encounter problems when recognizing that the
imperative is to optimize beliefs rather than maximize expected
utility explicitly. By recognizing the intractability of exact
Bayesian inference given the level of complexity we are
focused on, the variational approach, through free energy,
defines an upper bound on surprise or a lower bound on
model evidence/negative surprise. Action will hereby proceed
in reference to a functional of probability distributions over
preferred states, whereby current beliefs dictate the conditions
for optimal behavior, due consideration for prior preferences
taken (Friston et al., 2017; Parr and Friston, 2017). From the
perspective of Bayesian decision theory (Berger, 2011), this allows
us to utilize the complete class theorem (Brown, 1981) when
referring to both subjective utility and prior preferences, equating
one with the other.
The complete class theorem says that for any pair of loss
functions and decisions, there are some priors that render the
decision space optimal. This necessarily introduces a duality
between loss functions and priors that is resolved by making
them the same thing. In other words, for any observed choice or
decision, there are some priors that render this decision Bayes
optimal and, as such, described by the free energy principle.
By coupling this with sensory information update, what could
be termed a constrained optimization problem turns into an
adaptive optimization problem. So even though prior preferences
are called on to play the role of subjective utility, we are not in
possession of an objective function that describes the “goal” of the
optimization problem ex ante. In other words, we cannot say that
the objective of an agent is to minimize variational free energy but
only that the minimization of free energy provides the framework
through which any objective must be reached. With the free
energy formulation, we can therefore not prescribe an agent any
specific objectives or values but only state that there must be an
objective function and that this function is controlled exclusively
by beliefs. While this will render many statements derived from
the complete class theorem as unfalsifiable (Bowers and Davis,
2012), the theorem will primarily be leveraged to challenge the
precision of various scientific statements invoking the predicates
rational and irrational in regard to human behavior.
In the free energy principle, the goal is not to maximize
expected utility or the value of a world state but to
optimize beliefs about world states formally represented
by u∗t = arg min F (Q(st+1)|ut) through subsequent actions
π∗ = arg min
∑
τ
F (Q(sτ)|π) where uτ = π (τ) . Here, the first
task will be to resolve uncertainty about the consequences of
subsequent actions, which means that action cannot be a function
of the states in the world but must be a function of beliefs about
states in the world. This generates an intensity measure, or more
precisely an energy functional, here the free energy function
F of a function Q which describes an approximate posterior
distribution indicating beliefs given a policy π. We are not just
trying to optimize the next best action but the best sequences
of actions in line with a path integral, or a time average
∑
τ, of
an energy functional of beliefs about future world states sτ. This
is basically the same as invoking Hamilton’s principle of least
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action (i.e., accumulated cost) when framing policies in terms
of good or bad behavior as conceptualized by the economist,
read, rational, or irrational (Friston et al., 2012b). It is, however,
important to note that this formulation places an emphasis on
the order in which actions are undertaken.
The above equation says that the best way to move from
one point another, with beliefs about world states given a
particular policy, is to minimize variational free energy at each
step. Hamilton’s principle of least action says that the best path
between two points in space–time given a set of configurations
(Lagrangian) is the path where action is stationary (least).
Therefore, if we are in the business of minimizing free energy,
“optimal behavior” can be construed as following the principle
of least action, which, again, is a principle for minimizing
the cost associated with performing an action. Placed in a
policy framework, optimal behavior therefore implies ordered
actions and not ordered preferences per se, shifting the impetus
toward the context in which a preference becomes manifest by
highlighting the cost associated with deviations from stationary
action (i.e., adaptation).
Applying Hamilton’s principle of least action, in the context
of an information theoretic treatment of self-organization, can be
read as a tendency to resist an increase in disorder or entropy
by minimizing surprise (Friston, 2013). This can be cast in
terms of minimizing variational free energy that affords an upper
bound on surprise. Crucially, because surprise is also negative log
evidence, this looks exactly as if the system is trying to maximize
the evidence for its model of the world. In other words, self-
organization can be construed as self-evidencing (Hohwy, 2016)
by the minimization of expected self-information. All of these
perspectives are complementary ways of thinking about exactly
the same underlying phenomenon; namely, organization to an
attracting set of states that define the kind of states any system
prefers to be in.
We will see later how axiomatic failures are generally due
to context-sensitive choice behavior. This reflects a fundamental
distinction between economics and the free energy principle.
Because the free energy is a functional of probability distributions
of beliefs, this means that optimal choices (under some particular
prior preferences) depend upon current beliefs (Friston et al.,
2017; Parr and Friston, 2017). This is important because it means
that for any value of goods, the actual decisions will depend upon
beliefs at the time of deciding. This means there is no one-to-
one mapping between choice behavior and prior preferences or
subjective utility. A key drive of this epistemic behavior is the
value of information (Howard, 1966), reflecting the fact that the
imperative is to reduce expected surprisal or divergence from
prior preferences, not to maximize expected utility (Friston et al.,
2012a). This difference is made formally apparent when one
examines the various components of expected free energy that
include expected utility, when subjective utility is associated with
prior preferences.
Variational Free Energy
The principle states that all organic systems are characterized
by a common feature, the ability to combat the dispersal forces
of entropy on the cellular level, and counterbalance entropy
by exploiting energy from the surrounding environment. How
organic systems do this is by minimizing the property known as
variational free energy. An interesting aspect of this principle is its
logical extension from a biological/thermodynamical principle,
to a technical description of neurological processes. It is, however,
necessary to point out that variational free energy is not to
be confused with thermodynamic free energy. Under the free
energy principle, variational free energy is the upper bound
on entropic surprise, the surprise element being unforeseeable
or atypical states and events confronting the agent. This is
also known as the negative logarithm of model evidence in
information theory, where the average surprise over time is
entropy. More commonly, entropy is often interpreted as the
law that all things move to a less and less ordered state, and
while this interpretation is applicable herein, this paper will
exclusively refer to Claude Shannon’s average surprise over time
formulation whenever entropy is mentioned. More intuitively,
we can view entropy as the average amount of information
expected to be gained when sampling any random variable.
In order to minimize variational free energy, the brain must
generate a probabilistic model of the environment and all the
events typically encountered within it (Friston et al., 2006;
Buckley et al., 2017).
This model comprises a recognition density that corresponds
to the posterior probability of the hidden causes of sensory
input and a generative density that comprises a likelihood and
prior. The likelihood is simply the probability that the sensory
data were generated by the hidden states or causes, while priors
correspond to prior beliefs about those causes before seeing
the data. The Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence between the
recognition density (i.e., posterior) and the true posterior under
the generative density is referred to as an evidence bound or
variational free energy. By minimizing variational free energy,
the KL divergence approaches zero and the free energy becomes
the negative logarithm of model evidence. Instead of having
a model of the environment generated from the ground up
by sensory input alone, the free energy principle suggests that
the sensory inputs from the environment are inferred initially
from prior beliefs and subsequently matched with sensory
input by active sampling, often referred to as active inference.
This active inference generates prediction errors by matching
predicted with actual signals, and through iterative sampling,
i.e., iterative acts, the prediction errors diminish, minimizing
the KL divergence along with variational free energy (Friston
et al., 2006, 2009, 2010; Buckley et al., 2017). Behavior can
thereby be described by the following equation that prescribes
the probability of any policy in terms of expected free energy.
ln P (π) = −G (1)
where ln P (π) is the probability distribution of a policy π, and
G is the expected free energy. What we are saying here is simply
that the selection of a policy has a cost and that this policy cost is
equal to expected free energy. As such, this equation places a cost
on cognition (Kool et al., 2010; Redish, 2013).
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All policies will therefore be initiated with reference to the free






ln P (Oτ, Sτ|π)− ln Q (Sτ|π)
]
(2)
where ln P (Oτ, Sτ|π) is an energy term that describes that
hidden states in the world Sτ cause observable outcomes Oτ given
a particular policy π, and P is the probability distribution of
outcomes that are generated by hidden states. The ln Q (Sτ|π)
term describes the belief in the consequences of a policy, where
Q is an approximate posterior distribution of this belief, here
playing the role as the recognition density mentioned earlier.
(Technically, a distribution is over discrete event spaces, while
a density is over continuous random variables.) This can be
rearranged in terms of risk sensitivity and subjective utility
(Recall that we used the complete class theorem earlier in order
to associate prior preferences with subjective utility.).
G = EQ(Oτ,Sτ|π)
[
ln Q (St |Oτ, π)+ ln P (Oτ|m)− ln Q (Sτ|π)
]
(3)
If we remove any uncertainty or ambiguity with regard
to observations ln Q (St|Oτ, π), then what is left will be the
KL divergence, here indicating risk sensitivity or KL control
EQ(Oτ,Sτ|π)
[
ln P (Oτ|m)− ln Q (Sτ|π)
]
. Without ambiguity, this
term says that states are no longer hidden, which means that
states and observations are the same. Here the KL divergence
scores the difference between what we believe will happen given a
particular policy ln Q (Sτ|π) and what we want to have happen
ln P (Oτ|m) given a generative model of the world m, which
can also be described as our prior preferences about long-term
outcomes. This difference is therefore the same as a score for the
objective risk we are willing to accept, assuming a subjectively
well-defined log-likelihood. In other words, what is the perceived
probability of ending up in a specific world state, and how badly
do we want to do so.
This also means that if we remove relative risk ln Q (Sτ|π),
what we are left with is a term describing subjective utility





we expect our actions to maximize the probability of ending up
in a preferred world state based exclusively on our prior beliefs
(notice that the equation contains no hidden states).
The expected free energy can also be rearranged to be
expressed in terms of subjective utility under uncertainty (i.e.,
expected log evidence) and information gain. Here subjective
utility is associated with prior preferences about long-term
outcomes under the consideration of hidden states, where
there is an attraction to states of high expected probability or
minimum expected surprise. Because surprise is also negative
log evidence, expected/subjective utility can be seen as the same
as expected log evidence through the minimization of expected
surprise/minimum expected deviation from prior preferences.
The second term of Eq. 4 scores the information gain in terms
of the divergence between beliefs about future states with and
without observing outcomes. This is an important quantity in
optimal Bayesian design (Lindley, 1956) and many other fields,
where it is variously called salience, intrinsic value, intrinsic
motivation, and value of information (Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007;
Itti and Baldi, 2009; Schmidhuber, 2010; Barto et al., 2013).




+ EQ(Oτ |π) [DKL [Q (Sτ|Oτ, π) Q (Sτ|π)]] (4)
The last term EQ(Oτ|π) [DKL [Q (Sτ|Oτ, π) Q (Sτ|π)]] describes
information gain that resolves uncertainty by scoring the degree
to which uncertainty is reduced by pursuing a given policy
(Friston et al., 2017, 2016; Parr and Friston, 2019). Here,
the notion of adaptation is formally introduced, where the
imposition of unexpected information generates the necessity for
context-dependent belief updating.
If we then suggest that G can be viewed as an action scheme
that scores the goodness of any action sequence or policy (π),
we can then start to model an agent based on variational
first principles.
THE FREE ENERGY AGENT
Much of economics rests upon temporal discounting and the
change in the subjective value of various goods depending
upon when they will be secured. As with the broader literature
(Frederick et al., 2002; Kurth-Nelson and Redish, 2010),
under the free energy (active inference) formulation, this time
dependency is a natural consequence of dealing with uncertainty.
In other words, if there is uncertainty about volatility or how
states of the world unfold, then the expected utility of a particular
outcome will decrease as it recedes into the future (Friston et al.,
2014). This is a natural consequence of a loss of confidence (i.e.,
expected utility) about a preferred outcome that is a natural
consequence of accumulating uncertainty (Schwartenbeck et al.,
2015). Interestingly, time itself can be associated with the rate
of belief updating that depends upon the precision of beliefs
about the way things change (Mathys, 2012). This means there
is an intimate relationship between time sensitive changes in
valuation, and the precision of beliefs about state transitions.
Here a likelihood mapping is in the generative model used to
evaluate (expected) free energy. In what follows, the term “time
perception” will be used to refer to the information gain, that
is, the total amount of belief updating from the beginning of the
action sequence to the end.
Time Perception
Because belief updating is dependent on surprise/entropy, and
the fact that entropy is not uniformly distributed, it is suggested
that time perception is connected to the amount of belief
updating/work that must be performed within an externally
allotted time frame. This can be interpreted as an agent’s sense
of urgency. So even though uncertainty about state transitions
increases over time (Frederick et al., 2002; Kurth-Nelson and
Redish, 2010), time perception will be influenced by the rate
of belief updating that is required under various conditions.
If conditions change unexpectedly, this will influence time
perception/urgency (Roseboom et al., 2019), here a derivative of
the cost of computation given entropy.
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We therefore have a mechanism by which time perception
(information gain) is matched with, and mediated by, expected
free energy, communicating the degree to which an expected
action sequence is frustrated given the need for adaptation. This
is important, because it means that prior preferences, and the
precision with which these prior preference are held (Pezzulo
et al., 2018), directly determine the amount of entropy in the
entire action sequence from beginning to end through well-
defined expectations or beliefs (Schwartenbeck et al., 2013). These
prior preferences reflect a time sequence between a felt want
and expected utility at a future point in time, the divergence of
which is composed of a series of expected sequences of actions
(i.e., policies). When precision of prior preferences is written
down as a function of time, expected free energy therefore
reflects a time discount function that changes over time in
response to various levels of uncertainty about state transitions
(Kurth-Nelson et al., 2012).
Temporal Discounting
The dynamics of the variational free energy principle means
that active inference on future states (temporal discounting)
will only partly conform to “external time” as both process
limitations and adaptation becomes influencing factors. The
aspect of the free energy formulation that may constitute a
problem, however, is the inability of the principle to properly
disentangle choice behavior from temporal choice behavior, as
all choices will have an associated temporal dimension. Coupled
with the complete class theorem, this means that we can make any
perceivable discounting function conform to the principle, only
with varying degrees of probability. Exponential (Samuelson,
1937), hyperbolic (Ainslie, 1991), and quasi hyperbolic (Laibson,
1997) discount functions would all be permissible strategies for
any free energy agent, as well as the “speed” of the discounting
rate. It will therefore be easy to fall into the trap of ex post
reasoning, claiming that any new study on discounting behavior
can be explained with reference to variational free energy.
However, the key phrase is varying degrees of probability. The
free energy formulation is an account from first principles on
how systems must behave. By analyzing its different components,
we therefore see the different conditions that must be present
given a specific behavior. If agents’ discounting behaviors were
conforming to an exponential function, then there would have
to be very strict controls on the amount of information an agent
could sample, or the time frame that the agent would have to
“simulate,” eliminating the influence from the information gain
term. In a real world situation, this would not be impossible,
but highly improbable. If agents’ discounting behaviors were
conforming to a hyperbolic function, then there would have to
be a sufficiently large temporal dimension that would increase
uncertainty (accumulated cost), to the point where further
temporal increases become too costly to simulate, which is a
lot more probable. In regard to the smaller sooner/larger later
effect for instance, we should therefore be able to design a simple
experiment that would make this effect disappear.
The hyperbolic discounter would prefer $5 now over $7
tomorrow, but not $5 in a year over $7 in a year and a
day. In the free energy formulation, this preference reversal is
due to the uncertainty/cost in dealing with small consequences
over large time scales. What the agent is actually answering
is therefore more like answering if he would prefer $5 now
or $7 tomorrow, and $5 in a year or $7 in a year, simply
evaluating the present value of the future $5 compared to the
$7. To remove this effect, we would have to ask if the agent
preferred $5 now or $7 tomorrow and then ask the agent to
first imagine jumping 1 year forward in time and then proceed
to repeat the question. This should keep preferences stable with
a higher probability (Peters and Büchel, 2010; Benoit et al.,
2011). As such, we are asking the same question, but restricting
the amount of information the agent has to contend with by
removing the cost/strain afforded by the temporal simulation.
A way to quickly visualize this dynamic would be to envision
a confidence interval growing larger and larger over time, as
certainty about state transitions diminish proportionally. As
this interval grows larger, the cost associated with deviations
from least action will be diluted, as well as its influence on
expected free energy evaluated in the present. The probability
that a future choice simply reflects a discounted present choice
will therefore be small. Discount rates will, however, change
during the discounting period in response to information gain
with a far higher probability, reflecting belief updating and a
preceding search function (order) indicating the appropriateness
of a given policy (uncertainty resolution) (Kurth-Nelson et al.,
2012). This approach will hereby differ from models that explain
temporal discounting in terms of temporal projection or future
episodic thinking (Johnson and Redish, 2007; Kurth-Nelson
et al., 2012; van der Meer et al., 2012) and will be more
in line with suggestions from construal level theory (Trope
and Liberman, 2010), where the goal is to figure out how
to traverse a distance under various levels of abstraction, or
as the free energy approach would put it, various degrees of
uncertainty about state transitions (Schultz, 2016; Coddington
and Dudman, 2017; Covey and Cheer, 2019). That being said,
various efforts designed to reduce uncertainty over larger and
larger time frames, such as temporal projection or episodic future
thinking, should result in more stable discount functions due to
a decrease in expected complexity associated with the simulation
of state transitions (Peters and Büchel, 2010; Benoit et al., 2011;
Kurth-Nelson et al., 2012).
Hopefully the connection between time perception and
information gain has now become clearer. The crucial part is
to disconnect “external time” from “internal time,” where the
latter refers to the amount of work, or the strain of the system,
responding to surprise/entropy. Changing external time frames
will therefore not result in more or less “heuristic” behavior
but will result in more or less urgent behavior. Here this
urgency feeds back into expected free energy, possibly influencing
preference ordering and discount functions. This “strain” is
exactly the information gain, which follows from the fact that
the information gain is mathematically the expected degree of
belief updating as measured by the KL divergence in Eq. 4. The
higher the cognitive strain, the lower the present value of more
and more remote rewards, all else equal, and conversely, the faster
the discount rate on the future (Ebert and Prelec, 2007; Peters and
Büchel, 2010).
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FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
Any action is initiated by a call for alleviation or a rectification
of a psychological or biological state. The action schema (G)
then posits a set of causally related action sequences or policies
expected to work. The most often used successful strategies in
the past convey the highest probability for success, resulting
in a strongly weighted expectation following the principle of
least resistance or Hamilton’s principle of least action, which
under certain restrictive assumptions (e.g., perfect information)
can also be expressed as KL control or risk sensitivity (van den
Broek et al., 2010). The first step in any action sequence will be
to search out the information that is predicted to indicate an
appropriate policy (order). Based on the available information
in the environment, each sequential step toward the desired end
state is then motivated by a sub-strategy that seeks to align
predicted with actual events. By this measure, each step in the
action sequence is trying to resolve uncertainty about the next
course of action by revealing hidden states in the world, drawing
upon the wider action schema as an adaptive strategy when
perfect alignment of predictions and events is unsuccessful. Time
perception is the felt strain of the action sequence from beginning
to end, in addition to the added strain of necessary adaptive
behavior. Time perception can therefore fluctuate in response to
this adaptation, influencing intensity, urgency, and the potential
point of resignation along the action sequence.
Questioning the Axioms of the Expected
Utility Hypothesis
This of course questions one of the fundamental laws of expected
utility theory, namely, the law of transitivity, since subjective
value, and therefore preference, no longer can be said to be
a stable property of any individual, for any duration of time.
Moreover, it is also the case that the vast majority of preferred
future states are themselves hidden states to be discovered
through action, resulting in satisficing behavior (Simon, 1956), in
many instances purely epistemic, i.e., novel, curiosity satisfying or
salient. Few would therefore view a car as nothing but a machine
that transports one from A to B, or food as a nothing more than
simple sustenance. These things are imbued with properties to be
discovered beyond their immediate function, which means that
satisfying the same want can come in a myriad of different shapes,
sizes, colors, textures, and flavors, leaving plenty of room for
adaptive actions to solve the problem of how to satisfy a felt want.
In spite of the fact that a wide range of different goods
has the ability to satisfy the same want, it cannot be said,
however, that these goods therefore are of equal subjective value.
Different action sequences (policies) imply different evaluations
based on the different time strains they incur. This means that
even two identical goods can be valued differently at different
points in time depending on the amount of adaptation that is
necessary in order to obtain or use the goods. Thus, even the
truism of the reflexivity axiom cannot be said to hold when
factoring in any length of time. Having to adapt policies during
action sequences must hereby influence subjective valuations in
numerous obvious and subtle ways, meaning that one of the
staples of microeconomic consumer analysis, the indifference
curve, is likewise not commensurate with any notion of choice
in reference to human action and behavior.
This of course also questions the continuity and the revealed
preference axiom. We can see this more clearly when considering
that the suppression of variational free energy can be interpreted
as a proxy for subjective value, where the factors that influence the
former inform the latter. Thus, any attempt to measure or express
the latter, will likewise encounter the problem of measuring
or expressing the former, bearing in mind that variational free
energy is an energy term and not a quantity. Thus, by optimizing
beliefs, we remove the extensive property of utility and place
it within a softmax function that is constantly being modified
by the input from information gain. We can therefore say that
monotonicity or positive affine transformations with respect to
utility cannot apply to situations where there is uncertainty, since
uncertainty resolution is the ultimate “purpose” of information
gain, culminating in a variable time perception that alters
whatever utility function that might be deemed representative of
a stated set of preferences.
To illustrate this dynamic, imagine setting out to buy a long
desired bicycle that now has come on sale. Arriving at the store
you notice an unexpected queue forming outside. “Apparently
you were not the only one interested in buying that particular
bicycle.” Nevertheless, you must now decide whether to stand
in line with the other customers or return home empty handed.
Quite possible you will decide to wait in line, but the mere
fact that you contemplated your options signifies a decrease
in the present value of the bicycle, as it receded further into
the future compared to your initial expected action sequence.
Having now integrated your expectations with the act of standing
in line, further frustrations or surprises might indeed prompt
you to leave the store without completing your purchase, as the
present value of the bicycle consequently would fall even further.
However, you now spot an opportunity that allows you to skip
waiting in line without being discovered by the other customers.
Immediately you feel the intensity of your want increase and
experience a heightened sense of urgency as your pace quickens
and anticipation rises. Given your previous expectation (that
included standing in line), the present value of the bicycle
increases dramatically and adds an unexpected premium to the
bicycle compared to earlier.
This dynamic places utility and choice behavior within a
context that connects and mediates the expression of subjective
utility through action and adaptation. As such, present value
formulations become dependent on expected surprisal (risk), as
well as unexpected surprisal (uncertainty), where utility changes
dynamically in response to both. If an agent runs for the bus
as it is about to leave station and is ascribing some probability
for catching it, then he or she should be willing to pay a
premium for the bus fare in proportion to the probability ascribed
if actually catching it. In other words, an agent should be
willing to pay a premium for successfully completing an action
sequence when the action sequence affords the agent unexpected
costs and should therefore also be willing to bear a relatively
high unexpected cost in order to complete an action sequence.
That this behavior occurs under an optimizing scheme puts
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irrational behavior such as the sunk cost fallacy in a new light, by
highlighting some fundamental issues pertaining to a system that
tries to make predictions in a fundamentally uncertain setting.
Behavioral Implications of Indifference
The indifference curve describes a situation where an agent
chooses between various configurations or bundles of two
different goods, illustrated by a downward sloping convex curve.
The convexity of the indifference curve is due to a diminishing
marginal rate of substitution between the two goods, indicating
that agents would prefer a mix of goods instead of a higher
quantity of just one good. Any point on the curve is thus
equally as preferential as any other point, allowing for the
aforementioned indifference to occur. However, because the
present value of all goods depends on the perceived time flow
incurred from specific action sequences, urgency, and therefore
preference, along with derived utility, shifts in response to any
and all changes along the action sequence. This includes having
to choose between bundles X and Y. Concordantly, there can
be no indifference between one choice and another. This is
partly because this would imply having to perform two mutually
exclusive actions at the same time, but more importantly, because
adaptation during any action sequence is unavoidable and that
it would be correct to view this adaptation as either a gain or a
loss function on the end goal in response to any and all dynamic
updates to any action sequence (accumulated cost). A gain is
when an unexpected opportunity presents itself, shortening time
perception, heightening urgency, and increasing present value
of the good toward which the opportunity was afforded, and a
loss when externalities frustrate expectations, lengthening time
perception, lowering urgency, and decreasing present value of the
good toward which opportunity was frustrated.
The crucial part is that the initial act must be based on an
established belief system (action schema) including a policy for
resolving uncertainty. This expectation term selects an action
sequence born from experience and, in so doing, posits a more
or less articulated goal conveying a direction and a measure of
time denoting urgency. Unless this expectation term is perfectly
satisfied during the proposed action sequence, meaning that
no new information can present itself, there is no reason to
assume that setting out to buy milk will in fact result in the
purchase of milk, to say nothing of a specific brand of milk.
That is not the interesting part, however. The interesting part
is that all new information is weighted against the expectation
term, generating a modified action sequence based on the
available responses/actions “stored” in the wider action schema.
A necessary condition for indifference can therefore only be
inaction, since every choice an agent could possibly make lowers
the present value of every other alternative choice. If an agent
proclaimed to be indifferent between a red shirt and a blue
shirt, the only way to demonstrate this indifference would be
for the agent to choose neither and walk away. If an agent
chooses the blue shirt, but still proclaimed to be indifferent
between the blue and the red shirt, then the agent should have
no quarrels with swapping the one for the other. Also, once this
swap was completed, the agent should not have any objections
to swapping back. In fact, if the agent chooses the blue shirt,
but simultaneously proclaims to be indifferent, then the agent
should have no quarrels with swapping between the two shirts
indefinitely. What breaks this endless loop can be cast in terms
of variational free energy. When an action sequence is resolved,
free energy is minimized. Expending further energy toward
the resolution of the same want beyond this point introduces
a new action sequence that cannot but increase free energy
if the connected reward does not justify the computational
complexity incurred save for belief updating (recall that risk
corresponds to the expected complexity in Eq. 3). We see here
that a choice once committed to must carry a premium over
alternatives and will result in a different valuation behavior
pre commitment compared to post commitment/choice. The
literature on behavioral economics bears this out in numerous
examples, the most prevalent of which is the endowment effect
and the status quo bias (Kahneman et al., 1991).
Solving for preference is thus an “either/or,” not an “and/or”
problem, meaning that there is only one solution and one
solution alone to how the individual selects a given action
sequence. Ignoring opportunity costs for the time being (i.e.,
money), giving up some of good X in order to get some of
good Y is framing the problem incorrectly, since good X and
Y are linked to two different policies that in many cases just
happens to utilize a lot of the same actions up to a point. In
instances where an individual does in fact substitute one good for
another, this has to represent a decrease in the present value of the
initial formulation, due to either an unexpected opportunity or
an unexpected frustration. Invoking a probability p ∈ [0, 1] that





and the certainty of Y only serves to specify the point at which
there can be no information gained through further action, and
therefore, the point at which further action becomes meaningless.
Action is inherently uncertainty resolving (Eq. 4). If an agent is
indifferent between two outcomes, then the agent is not resolving
uncertainty and is therefore not acting.
CONCLUSION
This paper has used the variational free energy principle in
order to describe how complex organic systems optimize while
simultaneously being free to violate the axioms of expected utility
theory. The approach is centered on the optimization of beliefs
rather than the maximization of utility and, by this process,
depicts rational behavior as following Hamilton’s principle of
least action. This highlights the costs associated with deviations
from least action and establishes choice behavior as a function of
uncertainty resolution and adaptation (i.e., context). Once this
is done, many behavioral “anomalies” become “rational” when
framed in terms of a system that tries to make predictions and
perform actions in a fundamentally uncertain setting.
Additionally, this has consequences for temporal discounting
behavior, where discount functions become more or less erratic
reflecting, and depending on, real time adaptations. This erratic
discounting behavior can, however, be mitigated and mediated by
the perceived uncertainty and expected complexity connected to
state transitions over time.
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However, the implication that agents do in fact optimize,
and therefore do not exclusively employ psychological heuristics
in the decision process, serves to restrain more extraordinary
behavioral criticisms of standard economic theory. This also
places the behavioral economist at a disadvantage when
prescribing means and measures that purports to rectify apparent
failings of human cognition and decision making.
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